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bstract
In this paper, we study a sample of 1376 corporate asset sales and 250 asset exchanges in China between 1998 and 2006. We find that corporate
sset sales in China enhance firm value with a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 0.46% for the pre-announcement five-day period, which is
onsistent with the evidence discovered in both U.K. and U.S. For companies that exchanged assets during the sample period, the pre-announcement
ve-day CAR of 1.32% is statistically significant. We also discover that gains from divesting assets are positively related to managerial performance
easured by Tobin’s q ratio and the relative size of the asset sold or exchanged. Well-managed (high-q) companies are more likely to sell or exchange
ssets in a value-maximizing fashion than poorly managed (low-q) companies. Furthermore, asset-seller gains are not related to enhancing corporate
ocus, but improving corporate focus by exchanging for core assets enhances firm value.
2012 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Africagrowth Institute.
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.. Introduction
The market for corporate control has been extensively
esearched during the past four decades. For example, Jensen
nd Ruback (1983), and Jarrell et al. (1988) review much of
he scientific literature on changes in corporate control through
ergers, takeovers, acquisitions, divestitures, and the like, dur-
ng the 1970s and 1980s. Mulherin and Boone (2000) further
tudy the causes and effects of acquisitions and divestitures dur-
ng the 1990s. Many studies including the aforementioned have
onfirmed that these control transactions generally maximize
hareholders’ value.
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Broadly speaking, corporate divestiture refers to the reduc-
ion of assets through sell-offs, equity carve-outs, and spinoffs.
here is abundant research examining the announcement effects
f these three divesting activities on shareholder wealth in
eveloped economies. For instance, Alexander et al. (1984),
ain (1985), and Hite et al. (1987) document that asset-sale
nnouncements generate significant positive returns for selling
rms in the U.S. John and Ofek (1995) identify increasing cor-
orate focus as the source of asset-sale gain. Similarly, Kaiser
nd Stouraitis (1995) and Clubb and Stouraitis (2002) provide
European evidence on positive stock price reactions during
nitial announcements of subsidiary sell-offs. Hite and Owers
1983), Miles and Rosenfeld (1983), Schipper and Smith (1983),
lovin et al. (1995), and Mulherin and Boone (2000) all report
hat U.S. spin-off announcements are associated with strongly
ignificant abnormal returns. Murray (2000), Janssens de Vroom
nd Van Frederikslust (2000), and Veld and Veld-Merkoulova
2004) find similar results for U.K. and European spin-offs.
egarding equity carve-outs, Schipper and Smith (1986) show
hat announcements of equity carve-outs produce positive stock
eturns for parent firms, but Slovin et al. (1995) find signifi-
antly negative share price effects on rivals of subsidiaries to be
arved-out by a parent firm. Other studies document that the pos-
tive wealth effects for parents associated with equity carve-out
nnouncements are due to paying out the proceeds than if retain-
ng them (Allen and McConnell, 1998) and due to synergistic
ains (Mulherin and Boone, 2000).
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Table 1
Number of listed entities at the end of 2010.
Type Shanghai Stock
Exchange
Shenzhen
Stock
Exchange
Total
A Shares 895 473 1368
B Shares 54 54 108
Small and medium
enterprise board
0 531 531
ChiNext 0 153 153
S
t
r
t
i
a
l
e
T
c
w
i
s
(
i
o
l
a
t
z
t
t
c
fi
d
e
s
o
c
a
z
u
A
n
e
o
o
m
D
w
m
w
r
w
2
i
t
m
a
w
r
2
i
b
i
p
m
t
b
a
i
i
s
p
h
a
t
s
a
q
a
i
i
t
(
3
f
h
e
a
(
e
2
a
3
3
S
a
Announcement dates and financial data associated with theource: KMPG (2011).
As global markets are now more integrated than before, both
he issue of corporate governance and the market of corpo-
ate control are expeditiously spread from developed markets
o emerging markets. The purpose of this paper is to exam-
ne the wealth effects of two corporate restructuring activities,
sset sales and asset exchanges, in China. Since 1980, China has
aunched a number of schemes to reform its economic systems,
specially regarding state-owned enterprises (SOEs hereafter).
he privatization programs during the 1990s were designed to
reate a modern enterprise system based on the Company Law,
hich defines an SOE’s property right to dispose of its asset,
ncluding the equity of the state, and the state’s limited respon-
ibility to its shareholders in proportion to its capital contribution
Xu, 2000). By the end of March 2011, the combined market cap-
talization of China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen bourses had not
nly risen more than tenfold in the past six years to USD 4.2 tril-
ion but also surpassed the Tokyo Stock Exchange which stood
t USD 3.6 trillion (KMPG, 2011). Table 1 shows that more
han 2000 companies were listed on the Shanghai and Shen-
hen Stock Exchanges at the end of 2010. As China continues
o restructure its economy, not only have mergers and acquisi-
ions evolved rapidly in recent years in both style and substance,
orporate restructuring activities have also followed suit.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, this is the
rst study to our knowledge that uses a large sample of Chinese
ata to examine the valuation effects of asset sales and asset
xchanges. Currently, both equity carve-outs and spin-offs are
till technically infeasible in China due to the binding constraints
f the securities laws. Second, we identify the factors that may
ontribute to the positive wealth effects around asset-divesting
nnouncements. Third, amid the roll-out of China’s vast privati-
ation program, asset sales are common but asset exchanges are a
nique phenomenon in China, not seen in developed economies.
typical asset-exchange transaction can be illustrated by this
ews clip: “Xian ShengHong Technology Company agreed to
xchange the 8th, 15th, 16th, 23rd, 24th, 25th, and 28th floors
f Liangyu Building, which has 7045.34 m2 with a book value
f 52.713 million yuan and an estimated market value of 70.858
illion yuan, for a 70% ownership of HongPu International
evelopment Company, a subsidiary of HongPu Holdings Inc.,
hich has a net aset value of 63.733 million yuan and an esti-
ated market value of 70.399 million yuan. This asset exchange
as considered a fair market value exchange.” Hopefully, the
esults derived from this study shall shed some light on the
ealth effects of asset exchanges in China.
r
C
pelopment Finance 2 (2012) 1–8
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
provides literature review of asset sales and asset exchanges
n China. Section 3 describes sample selection and the charac-
eristics of divesting firms. Then, we discuss the event study
ethodology and present the evidence of positive wealth effects
round asset-divesting announcements. The sources of the
ealth effects are also identified by running cross-sectional
egressions. Finally, we conclude the paper.
. Literature review of asset sales and asset exchanges
n China
The research on asset sales and asset exchanges in China has
een anemic at best and most papers published are methodolog-
cally flawed with either a small sample size or a short sample
eriod. For example, Wang (1999) examines corporate perfor-
ance of 41 asset sales and 16 asset exchanges in 1998 and finds
hat ROE increases 1.99% for companies involving asset sales
ut declines 2.1% for companies that exchanged assets. Chen
nd Zhang (1999) study 14 asset sales and 6 asset exchanges
n 1997 and report that the cumulative abnormal return (CAR)
s statistically insignificant prior to the announcement date, is
ignificantly positive on the announcement date, and declines
ost the event date. Lu (2000) compares ROEs of 211 Shang-
ai Stock Exchange listed companies in 1999 two years before
nd after resturcturing and finds that ROE increases 48.6% for
he asset-sale sample but decreases 22.9% for the aset-exchange
ample. Chi and Ma (2000), investigating 30 asset sales and 5
sset exchanges in 1998, document that asset sales improve the
uality of assets and asset exchanges enhance both asset quality
nd corporate profitability.
Recently, Luo et al. (2003) discover a negative CAR dur-
ng the event window (−20, 20) for a sample of 44 asset sales
n 1998–2002, but a positive CAR of 0.7% and 0.93% during
he windows of (−1, 1) and (0, 7), respectively. Li and Chen
2004) use regression analysis to correlate the wealth effect of
3 asset sales and 28 asset exchanges in 2000 with various per-
ormance measures. Their finding supports the financial synergy
ypothesis but not the agency cost hypothesis. Jin et al. (2006)
xamine 100 restructuring companies including 16 asset sales
nd 25 asset exchanges in 2000 and show a CAR of 4.33% over
−15, 30) for the asset-sale sample but a zero CAR for the asset-
xchange sample. Yan and Wu (2010) study 76 divestitures in
006 and discover an insignificant CAR when companies sold
ssets.
. Sample selection and ﬁrm characteristics
.1. Sample selection
The original sample includes all companies listed on either
hanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange that
nnounced asset sales or asset exchanges during 1998–2006.estructuring companies were obtained from two sources: (1) the
hina Securities Journal and (2) the CSMAR database. The first
ress announcement date confirmed by both sources is identified
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Table 2a
Asset-sale sample distribution by industry and year.
Year/Industry 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total %
Ag., forest & fishery 3 1 1 5 3 4 7 7 2 33 2.4
Mining 1 1 1 3 1 7 0.5
Manufacturing 9 33 54 66 82 112 119 128 56 659 47.9
Construction 1 1 2 4 7 2 7 4 1 29 2.1
Information tech. 2 6 12 20 18 15 25 25 10 133 9.7
Retail & wholesale 1 8 11 12 15 18 18 25 12 120 8.7
Real estates 1 7 9 9 14 16 16 13 3 88 6.4
Services 1 2 1 2 7 3 7 9 5 37 2.7
Media 5 2 2 3 2 2 2 18 1.3
Conglomerate 2 23 27 26 35 41 48 35 15 252 18.3
T 84
% 13.4
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1.5 6.3 8.6 10.7
s the event day in this study. There were 4113 announcements
n total. We then eliminated companies that (1) announced other
estructuring activities or major corporate events during the
vent window, (2) lacked financial data or daily return data from
ay −150 to day +20 in relation to the first press announce-
ent day, (3) failed to disclose pertinent transaction data, (4)
ere financial distressed, and (5) were insurance companies,
nancial institutions, public utilities, and government-regulated
ompanies. For companies with multiple announcements that
ere adjacent to each other, only the first press announcement
as included in the sample. The final sample includes 1376 asset
ales and 250 asset exchanges with 1456 companies involved.
.2. Descriptive statistics
Tables 2a and 2b present the distribution of the sample firms
hat sold or exchanged assets during 1998 and 2006 by type
f industry and by calendar year. Industry clasification is based
n China Securities Regulatory Commission’s guidelines. As
hown, there are a total of 1376 asset sales and 250 asset
xchanges between 1998 and 2006. The number of asset-sale
ransactions is recorded with only 20 in 1998 but peaks in 2004
ith 252, with 47.9% of asset sales occurring in the manufac-
uring sector and 18.3% in conglomerates. Asset exchanges,
owever, are clustered between 2000 and 2004, averaging about
0 transactions per year. Like their asset-sale counterparts, asset
e
r
e
m
able 2b
sset-exchange sample distribution by industry and year.
ear/Industry 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
g., forest & fishery 2 3 2
ining 1
anufacturing 7 16 17 26
onstruction
nformation tech. 1 1 2 4
etail & wholesale 1 3 1 4
eal estates 2 2 2 4 3
ervices 2 1
edia 1 2 1
onglomerate 2 5 7 7 7
otal 6 15 33 37 48
2.4 6.0 13.2 14.8 19.2214 252 249 104 1376 100
15.6 18.3 18.1 7.6 100
xchanges are also concentrated in the manufacturing sector
56.0%) and in conglomerates (16.0%).
Table 3 shows the distribution of sample firms by number of
ivesting events, number of divesting companies, and average
arket value per transaction and per divesting company across
ears. As shown, the average market value per asset-sale trans-
ction is only 61.037 million yuan, which is about 45% of the
verage asset-exchange deal of 134.525 million yuan. Further-
ore, although there are more asset sales from 2002 to 2005,
he average transaction size during this period is much smaller
ompared to that in 2000–2001. Regarding asset exchanges, the
verage transaction size, which peaks in 2001, is more than twice
he average size of an asset-sale transaction. Same observation
lso applies to the average market value of divesting events per
ivesting company.
. Empirical results
.1. Wealth effects around asset-sale and asset-exchange
nnouncements
To examine the wealth effects around asset-sale and asset-
xchange announcements, we compute both market-adjusted
eturn and market-model adjusted return for each day in the
vent period 20 trading days before and after each announce-
ent. The market-adjusted return is the raw return minus the
2003 2004 2005 2006 Total %
1 3 11 4.4
2 1 4 1.6
26 28 11 9 140 56.0
2 2 0.8
2 2 1 13 5.2
1 2 1 13 5.2
1 1 15 6.0
1 1 1 6 2.4
2 6 2.4
6 1 5 40 16.0
40 39 23 9 250 100
16.0 15.6 9.2 3.6 100
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Table 3
Characteristics of sample firms by number of divesting events, number of divesting companies, average market value per divesting event and per divesting across
years.
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
# Of divesting events 26 102 152 184 232 254 291 272 113 1626
Asset sale 20 87 119 147 184 214 252 249 104 1376
Asset exchange 6 15 33 37 48 40 39 23 9 250
# Of divesting companies 24 97 140 167 207 223 247 247 104 1456
Asset sale 18 82 107 130 160 185 211 224 95 1212
Asset exchange 6 15 33 37 47 38 36 23 9 244
Mean value of each divesting
event (in million Yuan)
68.290 69.293 89.095 96.844 64.675 64.966 65.835 70.922 65.999 72.336
Asset sale 65.245 59.965 72.088 72.398 52.147 57.914 55.859 62.996 62.432 61.037
Asset exchange 78.440 123.395 150.426 193.970 112.697 102.699 130.297 156.729 107.217 134.525
Mean value of divesting
events per company (in
million Yuan)
73.981 72.865 96.732 106.703 72.486 73.998 77.563 78.100 71.710 80.782
Asset sale 72.495 63.622 80.172 81.865 59.969 66.992 66.713 70.026 68.346 69.296
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(CAR = 1.50%).
Table 4a
Average abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for
1376 asset-sale and 250 asset-exchange announcements during 1998–2006.
t 1376 asset sales 250 asset exchanges
ARt (%) CAR (%) ARt (%) CAR (%)
−20 0.00 0.00 −0.27 −0.27
−10 0.00 −0.55*** 0.09 0.15
−9 0.06 −0.49** 0.19 0.34
−8 −0.06 −0.55** 0.14 0.48
−7 −0.01 −0.56** −0.06 0.42
−6 0.08 −0.48** −0.09 0.32
−5 0.00 −0.48** −0.01 0.32
−4 0.03 −0.45* 0.04 0.36
−3 0.03 −0.41 0.29** 0.64
−2 0.05 −0.37 0.40*** 1.05*
−1 0.10 −0.27 0.25* 1.30**
0 0.24*** −0.03 0.34** 1.64**
1 −0.16** −0.18 0.17 1.81***
2 −0.15** −0.34 0.16 1.97***
3 −0.05 −0.39 0.18 2.15***
4 −0.03 −0.42 −0.19 1.96***
5 −0.09 −0.52 −0.04 1.92***
6 0.00 −0.52 0.10 2.03***
7 0.03 −0.49 −0.09 1.94***
8 0.07 −0.42 −0.13 1.82**
9 −0.01 −0.43 0.07 1.89**
10 −0.03 −0.46 −0.19 1.70**
20 −0.07 −0.45 −0.03 1.50*sset exchange 78.440 123.395 150.426 193.9
eturn of either the Shanghai Stock Exchange A Share Index or
he Shenzhen Stock Exchange Component A Index. The market-
odel adjusted return is the raw return minus a market-model
xpected return. The market-model expected return is based on
regression on the previous 130 trading days, from day −150 to
ay −21 relative to the announcement day. Finally, the average
bnormal return (AR) for each relative day is computed as the
ean of market-adjusted (market-model adjusted) returns for
ll the companies in the sample, and the cumulative abnormal
eturn (CAR) on any day is the sum of the average abnormal
eturn through that day.
The stock price reactions around asset-sale and asset-
xchange announcements are summarized in Table 4a, which
hows daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns
rom 20 days before the announcement (t = 0) to 20 days after
he announcement. The cumulative abnormal returns for vari-
us intervals, their associated test statistics, and the proportion
f positive cumulative abnormal returns are reported in Table 4b.
ecause the results from both market-adjusted returns and
arket-model adjusted returns are similar in all aspects, we only
eport the results from market-adjusted returns.
For the asset-sale sample, the average daily abnormal returns
uring the pre-announcement period (from day −4 to day 0) are
ll positive but only statistically significant on the announcement
ay. The average daily post-announcement (days 1 through 5)
bnormal returns, however, are all negative and are significant
or days 1 and 2 (−0.16% and −0.15%). The CAR for the whole
vent window from day −20 to day +20 is −0.45%, which is
ot statistically significant at all.
Regarding the asset-exchange sample, the average daily pre-
nnouncement abnormal returns are all positive and statistically
ignificant from day −3 to day 0. The CAR is significantly
ositive for the five-day event window from day −4 to day 0
CAR = 1.32%) and the two-day announcement window from
ays −1 to day 0 (CAR = 0.57%), respectively. Both CARs
re much bigger in magnitude than their asset-sale counter-
arts (1.32% vs. 0.46% and 0.57% vs. 0.34%). As depicted in
ig. 1, the CAR for the 1376 asset-sale announcements over the *115.095 108.104 141.155 156.729 107.217 137.833
1-day period falls gradually from day −20 until day −6, then
eaks at day 0 (CAR = −0.03%), and drifts downward toward
ay +20 (CAR = −0.45%). On the contrary, the CAR for the 250
sset-exchange announcements rises initially, picks up momen-
um from day −3 toward day 0 (CAR = 1.64%), then peaks at
ay +3 (CAR = 2.15%), and drifts downward toward day +20* Significant at the 10% level, two-tailed test.
** Significant at the 5% level, two-tailed test.
** Significant at the 1% level, two-tailed test.
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Table 4b
Summary of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), the t-statistics (in parenthe-
ses), and the proportion of positive CARs (in square brackets) for various event
windows for 1376 asset-sale and 250 asset-exchange announcements during
1998–2006.
Interval 1376 asset sales 250 asset exchanges
(−4, 0) 0.46%** (3.28) [54.35%] 1.32%**(4.25)[62.50%]
(−1, 0) 0.34%** (3.89) [53.27%] 0.57%**(2.91)[56.45%]
(+1, +5) −0.49%**(−3.53)[43.90%] 0.23% (0.73) [48.79%]
(−20, +20) −0.45% (−1.14) [45.57%] 1.44% [1.62] [54.03%]
** Significant at the 1% level, two-tailed test.
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Table 6
Announcement-period abnormal returns and the role of managerial performance
measured by Tobin’s q ratio.
Panel A: 1,376 asset-sale sample
(1)
q > mean
(N = 433)
(2)
q < mean
(N = 943)
(3) = (1) − (2)
Difference
CAR(−4, 0) 1.00%***
(7.22)
0.19%
(1.34)
0.81%***
(13.14)
Panel B: 250 asset-exchange sample
(1)
q > mean
(N = 84)
(2)
q < mean
(N = 166)
(3) = (1) − (2)
Difference
CAR(−4, 0) 2.33%***
(7.53)
0.16%
(0.52)
2.17%***
(15.67)
*
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tig. 1. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) plots for 1376 asset sales and 250
sset exchanges from day −20 to day +20.
The above announcement results for both asset sales and asset
xchanges in China are inconsistent with the findings of prior
hinese studies. Since those studies are flawed with a small
ample size, our findings based on a substantially large sample
nd over a nine-year span can make general inferences for both
sset-sale and asset-exchange events in China. Furthermore, our
esult that corporate asset sales in China enhance firm value
uring the announcement period is consistent with the evidence
iscovered in both U.K. and U.S., but the two-day (−1, 0) CAR
f only 0.35% is so minute in magnitude when compared to
ts U.K. and U.S. counterparts reported in Table 5. As shown,
he two- or three-day abnormal returns generated by asset-sale
nnouncements are strongly significant, ranging from 1.10% to
.60% for U.S. companies (Hite et al., 1987; Lang et al., 1995;
lovin et al., 1995; Hirschey and Zaima, 1989; Mulherin and
able 5
elected event studies of asset sales in both U.S. and U.K. that include time
eriod, event window, and CAR.
tudy Time period Event window CAR (%)
.S. asset sales
ite et al. (1987) 1963–1981 (−1, 0) 1.66
irschey and Zaima (1989) 1975–1982 (−1, 0) 1.64
ang et al. (1995) 1984–1989 (−1, 0) 1.41
lovin et al. (1995) 1980–1991 (0, +1) 1.70
ulherin and Boone (2000) 1990–1999 (−1, +1) 2.60
atta et al. (2003) 1982–1992 (−1, 0) 1.63
ohn and Ofek (1995) 1986–1988 (−1, +1) 1.50
.K. asset sales
aiser and Stouraitis (1995) 1984–1987 (−1, 0) 1.33
lubb and Stouraitis (2002) 1984–1994 (−1, 0) 1.10
f
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f** Significant at the 1% level, two-tailed test.
oone, 2000; Datta et al., 2003; Dittmar and Shivdasani, 2003;
ohn and Ofek, 1995) and about 1.10–1.33% for U.K. companies
Kaiser and Stouraitis, 1995; Clubb and Stouraitis, 2002).
.2. Factors contributing to the positive price responses
In this section, we first examine the role of managerial
erformance, measured by Tobin’s q, in explaining the value
enerated from both asset-sale and asset-exchange transactions.
heq-ratio has been extensively used to measure managerial per-
ormance in the corporate restructuring literature. For example,
ang et al. (1989) and Servaes (1991) find that takeover gains
re larger when targets have low q-ratios and bidders have high
-ratios. However, Lang et al. (1995) show that the seller’s q-
atio has no explanatory power in explaining the abnormal stock
eturn around sell-off announcements, but Datta et al. (2003)
ocument that high-q sellers experience larger gains than low-q
ellers. Following Servaes (1991) and Datta et al. (2003), among
thers, we define Tobin’s q as the ratio of market value of assets
o book value of assets. The market value of assets is computed
s the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus
he market value of equity.
To investigate the impact of managerial performance on gains
rom asset sales/exchanges, we first divide our sample into high-
and low-q categories. Datta et al. (2003) classify firms as
igh-q or low-q based on a cut-off of one because the mean
f their sample companies’ q-ratios is close to one. In our sam-
le, nearly 97% of the asset-selling companies have their q-ratio
arger than one with a mean of 2.40, whereas about 95% of the
ompanies that exchanged assets have q-ratio higher than one
ith a mean of 2.72. Both q-ratio means are substantially higher
han the U.S. mean of 1 reported in Datta et al. Therefore, we
ypothesize that if a company’s q-ratio is higher than the sample
ean, it is deemed better managed than its low-q counterparts.
onsequently, we use each sample’s mean q-ratio as the cut-off
o classify firms into high-q and low-q groups.
As shown in Table 6 Panel A, there are 433 asset-selling com-
anies in the high-qgroup and 943 companies in the low-qgroup.
he five-day CAR(−4, 0) for the high-q group is 1.00% which
s significant at the 1% level, whereas the corresponding CAR
or the low-q group is only 0.19%. The CAR difference between
6 W. Huang, K.C. Chen / Review of Development Finance 2 (2012) 1–8
Table 7
Announcement-period abnormal returns and changes in corporate focus.
Panel A: 1,376 asset-sale sample
(1)
Increase focus
(N = 567)
(2)
Decrease focus
(N = 734)
(3)
Cannot decide
(N = 75)
(4) = (1) − (2)
Difference
CAR(−4, 0) 0.43%**
(2.00)
0.50%***
(2.65)
−0.05%
(−0.08)
−0.07%
(1.20)
Panel B: 250 asset-exchange sample
(1)
Increase focus
(N = 147)
(2)
Decrease focus
(N = 91)
(3)
Cannot decide
(N = 12)
(4) = (1) − (2)
Difference
CAR(−4, 0) 1.85%***
(4.27)
0.72%**
(2.31)
0.71%
(0.40)
1.13%***
(8.17)
*
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m** Significant at the 5% level, two-tailed test.
** Significant at the 1% level, two-tailed test.
he two groups is 0.81% which is significantly at the 1% level.
his result is consistent with Datta et al.’s (2003) finding that the
igher the seller’s q-ratio, the more the selling firm gains in the
.S. For the asset-exchange sample, the high-q group (84 firms)
as a CAR of 2.33% which is significant at the 1% level, but the
ow-q group (166 firms) has an insignificant CAR of only 0.16%.
he CAR difference between the two groups is 2.17% which is
ignificant at the 1% level. In summary, shareholder gains are
ositively related to the divesting company’s managerial perfor-
ance. It is perceived that well-managed (high-q) firms are more
ikely to sell or exchange assets in a value-maximizing fashion
han poorly managed (low-q) firms.
Next, the empirical evidence provided by Comment and
arrell (1995) and John and Ofek (1995) that improving focus
hrough corporate divestitures enhances firm value motivates
he refocusing strategy hypothesis. Their argument is that man-
gerial skills may be well suited to the management of a core
usiness, but not to the management of non-core assets. Neg-
tive synergies arise when assets unrelated to core operations
revent a firm from focusing on its core competencies. Elim-
nating negative synergies between the divested asset and the
emaining core assets should eventually lead to better perfor-
ance for the core assets after the divestiture. Therefore, when
company sells a non-core asset or exchanges an asset for a core
sset, it is hypothesized to enhance corporate focus.
In Table 7 the five-day CAR results are compared between
ompanies that increase focus and companies that do not
ncrease focus. Regarding the 1376 asset-sale sample, 567 (734)
rms increase (decrease) corporate focus by selling non-core
core) assets. The mean five-day CAR for the focus-increasing
roup is 0.43% (significant at the 5% level) vs. 0.50% (signifi-
ant at the 1% level) for the focus-decreasing group. The CAR
ifference between the two groups is −0.07%, which is not sta-
istically significant. In other words, enhancing corporate focus
as no explanatory power in explaining seller gains, which is
onsistent with Datta et al.’s (2003) finding.
Among the 250 companies that exchanged assets, 147 com-
anies have sharpened corporate focus by exchanging for assets
hat are related to the company’s core business, whereas 91
ompanies have decreased corporate focus by exchanging for
on-core assets. The five-day CAR for the focus-increasing
m
a
2
croup is 1.85% (significant at the 1% level) vs. 0.72% (signifi-
ant at the 5% level) for the focus-decreasing group. The CAR
ifference between the two groups is 1.13%, which is significant
t the 1% level. Therefore, the above result supports the find-
ng of Comment and Jarrell (1995) and John and Ofek (1995)
hat improving corporate focus by exchanging for core assets
ncreases firm value.
Lastly, Lang et al. (1995) propose and test the financing
ypothesis that if asset-sale proceeds are used to repay debt,
arent announcement-period returns will be higher than if pro-
eeds had been retained. However, out of 1376 asset-sale events
n China, only 45 transactions reveal the use of asset-sale pro-
eeds to repay debt, whereas only 3 out of 250 asset-exchanges
se proceeds to repay debt. Since the super majority of the Chi-
ese divesting companies retained proceeds as cash for corporate
ses, we cannot perform the test of the financing hypothesis.
.3. Cross-sectional analysis of wealth gains
Since the role of managerial performance is significant for
oth samples, we also run the following multiple regression
y including two control variables: (1) Dummy Fit, which is a
ummy variable reflecting whether the asset sold or exchanged
esults in a sharpened focus for the divesting company, and (2)
S, the relative size of the asset sold or exchanged.
AR = α0 + α1Dummy q + α2Dummy Fit + α3Log(RS) + ε
here CAR is the cumulative abnormal returns over (−4, 0);
ummy q equals 1 if q > mean and 0 otherwise; Dummy Fit
quals 1 if company increases focus by selling a non-core asset
r exchanging for a core asset and 0 otherwise; RS is defined as
he reported asset sale/exchange price divided by the asset value
f the parent at the year-end prior to the announcement of the
ransaction.
Table 8 presents the summary statistics of maximum,
inimum, mean, median, and standard deviation for the afore-
entioned variables. One item worth mentioning is that the mean
nd median of the relative size of the asset sold are nearly 5% and
%, which are much smaller than those of the asset-exchange
ounterpart (14% and 8%), respectively.
W. Huang, K.C. Chen / Review of Dev
Table 8
Descriptive statistics of the sample firms.
Maximum Minimum Mean Median Std. dev.
Panel A: 1376 asset-sale sample
Dependent variable
Car(−4, 0) 29.03% −34.56% 0.46% 0.31% 4.83%
Characteristics of asset-sale firms
q 40.65 0.48 2.40 1.80 1.98
Dummy q 1.00 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.46
Dummy Fit 1.00 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.49
RS 1.31 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.08
Panel B: 250 asset-exchange sample
Dependent variable
Car(−4, 0) 26.22% −20.06% 1.32% 0.94% 4.50%
Characteristics of asset-exchange firms
q 26.10 0.79 2.72 2.02 2.28
Dummy q 1.00 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.47
Dummy Fit 1.00 0.00 0.59 1.00 0.49
r
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pRS 0.79 0.00 0.14 0.08 0.14
Table 9 reports the estimates for various cross-sectional
egressions. Regressions (1)–(3) are univariate regressions,
egression (5) represents the full model, and regression (4) is
he restricted model that excludes relative size (RS). According
o Vijh’s (2002), RS is a proxy for wealth gains on account of
ll of the divestiture gains hypotheses.As shown by the univariate regressions, the results for
ummy q and Dummy Fit are consistent with those reported in
able 9
ultivariate tests of the announcement-period (−4, 0) CARs, 1998–2006.
ariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
anel A: 1376 asset-sale sample
ntercept 0.0019 0.0045*** 0.0145*** 0.0020 0.0115***
(1.190) (2.661) (4.690) (1.042) (3.156)
ummy q 0.0082*** 0.0082*** 0.0063**
(2.916) (2.916) (2.225)
ummy Fit −0.0002 −0.0003 −0.0008
(−0.083) (−0.109) (−0.290)
og(RS) 0.0058*** 0.0050***
(3.586) (3.060)
-value 8.5051*** 0.0068 12.8569*** 4.2555** 5.9740***
-Value 0.0036 0.9341 0.0003 0.0144 0.0005
2 0.0061 0.0000 0.0093 0.0062 0.0129
djusted R2 0.0054 −0.0007 0.0085 0.0047 0.0107
anel B: 250 asset-exchange sample
ntercept 0.0090** 0.0064 0.0276*** 0.0024 0.0139*
(2.616) (1.459) (4.600) (0.519) (1.730)
ummy q 0.0143** 0.0134** 0.0102*
(2.412) (2.272) (1.659)
ummy Fit 0.0125** 0.0116** 0.0105*
(2.194) (2.041) (1.844)
og(RS) 0.0123** 0.0087*
(2.591) (1.754)
-value 5.8181** 4.8130** 6.7116** 5.0284*** 4.4066***
-Value 0.0166 0.0292 0.0102 0.0072 0.0049
2 0.0231 0.0192 0.0266 0.0394 0.0514
djusted R2 0.0191 0.0152 0.0226 0.0316 0.0397
* Significant at the 10% level, two-tailed test.
** Significant at the 5% level, two-tailed test.
** Significant at the 1% level, two-tailed test.
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ables 6 and 7. The coefficient for relative size is also positive
nd statistically significant for both samples. This finding is con-
istent with most of the previous studies summarized in Table 5
hat document a statistically positive relationship between the
ealth effect and the relative size of the divestiture. Further-
ore, the multivariate regression results indicate that both full
nd restricted regression models are statistically significant at
he 5% level, or better. In the absence of RS, the coefficient for
ummy q remains the same, statistically significant, for both
amples, and the coefficient for Dummy Fit is statistically sig-
ificant for the asset-exchange sample but insignificant for the
sset-sale sample. Overall, the multivariate results confirm the
ndings obtained from the univariate tests.
. Conclusions
Using a sample of 1376 asset sales and 250 asset exchanges
n China between 1998 and 2006, this study first examines
hether asset-sale and asset-exchange announcements generate
ny stock price reaction and subsequently explores the sources
f the likely wealth gains based on several divestitures gain
ypotheses.
This paper first finds evidence that there are significantly
ositive stock price reactions during asset-sale announcements,
hich is consistent with the evidence found in U.K. and U.S.
hen companies exchanged assets, their average daily pre-
nnouncement abnormal returns are all positive and statistically
ignificant. The wealth gains from asset exchanges are bigger
han those from asset sales.
The cross-sectional regression results also document that
hareholder gains are positively related to the divesting com-
any’s managerial performance and the relative size of the asset
old or exchanged. It is perceived that divesting firms with
uperior managerial performance experience a larger value cre-
tion when divesting assets. Furthermore, asset-seller gains are
ot related to enhancing corporate focus, but companies that
xchanged for core assets to sharpen focus gain 1.13% in CAR,
hich is significant at the 1% level, more than that of companies
hat exchanged for non-core assets.
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